Adolf Hitler on 'England as an Ally'

A longish read...

England as an Ally

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That England has a clear foreign policy goal is proved by the fact of the existence and therewith of the rise of this giant empire. Let no one fancy, after all, that a world empire can ever be forged without a clear will thereto.

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The opinion that a world empire owes its rise to chance, or that, at least, the events which conditioned its establishment were accidental historical processes which always turned out luckily for a nation, is false. Ancient Rome owed its greatness, exactly as does presentday England, to the soundness of Moltke's assertion that in the long run luck is always with the fit. This fitness of a Folk in no way lies only in racial value, but also in the ability and skill with which these values are applied. A world empire of the size of ancient Rome, or of present day Great Britain, is always the result of a marriage between the highest race value and the clearest political aim.

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Although now a great part of the English Folk, indeed the average in general, is inferior to the German peak value, nevertheless the centuries old tradition of this Folk has become so much part of its own flesh and blood that vis-à-vis our own German Folk it possesses considerable political advantages. If today the globe has an English world empire, then for the time being there is also no Folk which, on the grounds of its general civic political characteristics as well as its average political sagacity, would be more fitted for it.



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England needed markets and sources of raw material for her commodities, and she secured these markets for herself through power politics. This is the sense of English colonial policy. If later even England nevertheless mouthed the word culture, it was only from a purely propagandistic viewpoint, so that she also could morally embroider her own exceedingly sober actions somewhat. In reality the living conditions of the savages were a matter of complete indifference to the English as long, and to the extent, that they did not affect the living conditions of the English themselves. That later still other ideas, of a political prestige character, were linked with colonies of the size of India is conceivable and understandable.

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This policy of a gradual conquest of the world, in which economic power and political strength always went hand in hand, conditioned England's position vis-à-vis other States. The more England grew into her colonial policy, the more she required dominion over the seas, and the more she achieved dominion over the seas, the more, in consequence of this, she became again a colonial power. But then also, the more jealously did she finally begin to watch that nobody competed with her for dominion of the seas or of colonial possessions.

There is a very erroneous and widespread notion, especially in Germany, according to which England would immediately fight against any European hegemony. As a matter of fact this is not correct. England actually concerned herself very little with European conditions as long as no threatening world competitor arose from them, so that she always viewed the threat as lying in a development which must one day cut across her dominion over the seas and colonies.


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England's relations vis-à-vis Prussia prove that she does not fundamentally oppose resistance to a European great power of superior military importance, as long as the foreign policy aims of this power are manifestly of a purely continental character.

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Nothing speaks so well for the outstanding statesmanship, especially of Frederick William I, than the fact that, with all the scanty and surely infinitely limited means of the small Prussian State, he concentrated exclusively on the promotion of the Land Army. Not only for the reason that through it this small State could maintain a superior position in one weapon, but was thereby also spared England's enmity.

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If German Prussia and then later Germany in general wanted to go toward a future, it could only be guaranteed by a supremacy on land which matched the English supremacy on the seas. It was Germany's misfortune that we slowly moved away from this insight and built up our land power insufficiently and instead went over to a naval policy whose end result had been inadequate anyway. Even the Germany of the post Bismarckian period could not afford the luxury of creating and maintaining a superior armament on land and sea simultaneously. It has been one of the most important principles of all times that a nation recognise which weapon is most necessary and indispensable for the preservation of its existence, and then promote it to the extreme by staking all its means on it. England recognised and followed this principle. For England, dominion of the seas was really the substance of her existence. Even the most brilliant military periods on the mainland, the most glorious wars, the most matchless military decisions, could not move the English to see in land power for England anything but something ultimately subordinate, and to concentrate the whole strength of the nation on the maintenance of a superior dominion of the seas.

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As long as Prussia limited herself to purely European aims in her foreign policy aspirations, she had no serious danger to fear from England.

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The course of the anti German attitude of the English can be exactly followed. It parallels our development on the seas, rises with our colonial activity to an overt antipathy, and finally ends up with our naval policy in a frank hatred.

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If Germany had not taken this development, at the turn of the century we still could have reached an understanding with England, which at that time was ready for one. To be sure, such an understanding would have lasted only if had been accompanied by a fundamental shift in our foreign policy goal. Even at the turn of the century Germany could have decided upon a resumption of the former Prussian continental policy, and, together with England, prescribed the further development of world history.

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Once Germany, however, had shunned such a fundamental understanding with England, which, as already noted, would have made durable sense only if in Berlin a clear continental territorial political aim had been arrived at, England began to organise the world resistance against the country threatening British interests as regards her dominion of the seas.

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To be sure, Germany was finally overcome, but only after the American Union had made its appearance on the battlefield, and Germany had lost the support of her rear in consequence of the internal collapse of the homeland. But the actual English war aim had not been achieved thereby. Indeed, the German threat to English supremacy on the seas was eliminated, but the American threat, with a considerably stronger base, took its place. In the future the greatest danger to England would not be in Europe any more at all, but in North America.

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In Europe itself at this time, France is the State that is most dangerous to England. Her military hegemony has an especially threatening significance for England, in consequence of the geographical position which France occupies vis-à-vis England.

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Whoever in presentday Europe tries to find natural enemies against England will always chance upon France and Russia: France as a power with continental political aims, which in truth, however, are only a cover for very widely demarcated intentions of a general international political character; Russia as a threatening enemy of India and the possessor of oil sources which today have the same importance once possessed by iron and coal mines in past centuries.

If England herself remains true to her great world political aims, her potential opponents will be France and Russia in Europe, and, in the other parts of the world, especially the American Union in the future.

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If, however, Germany comes to a fundamentally new political orientation which no longer contradicts England's sea and trade interests, but spends itself in continental aims, then a logical ground for England's enmity, which would then be just hostility for hostility's sake, would no longer exist. For even the European balance of power interests England only as long as it hinders the development of a world trade and sea power that may threaten England. There is no foreign policy leadership at all which is less determined by doctrines that bear no relation to life's realities than the English. A world empire does not come into being by means of a sentimental or purely theoretical policy.

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Hence the sober perception of British interests will be determining for English foreign policy in the future too. Whoever cuts across these interests will thereby also be England's enemy in the future.

Hitler did in fact not want war with Britain. He admired the British Empire, particularly in India and often cited its example when talking to his confidantes about what he planned to do in Russia. Hitler had no desire to fight Britain. Ideally he wanted Britain on his side in the war against the east.

However, Hitler's own policy objectives which if pursued inexorably would have meant hegemony on the continent is not something Britain could ever have accepted. Hitler always saw France as a mortal enemy that had to be struck down before his crusade in the east. He failed to see that Britain could never accept that and that war against France would be bound to line up Britain against him.

War with Britain was never the war he wanted but he failed to understand that war with France would inevitably mean war with Britain. Not pursuing war with Britain whilst aiming to defeat France was an impossible policy goal because Britain was never going to stand aside if he sought a reckoning with France. Nor could Britain long tolerate German domination of France and the Low Countries.

For peace with Britain to have worked he would have needed peace with France, and not to have attacked in the west. The fly in the ointment was his determination to attack in the east and the unwillingness of Britain and France to acquiesce when the target was their ally Poland.

It is interesting to speculate what the outcome might have been if Hitler had got his way in Poland without war. Perhaps by a return of Germany's 1914 borders in the east and the establishment of a satellite polish government ready to do Germany's bidding in charge of the rest - a bit like Tiso's government in the puppet state of Slovakia. Had Hitler followed this by a crusade against the USSR, the western powers whose governments feared it more than Germany might well have stood aside and let him get on with it, perhaps even offered support. Under such circumstances he might have defeated the USSR. If he had then turned and dealt with France, the German position in Europe might well have become unassailable. So perhaps in the long run it is a good thing that the intransigence of the Poles dragged us into war against him whilst the USSR was still in being as a powerful future enemy of Germany

I'm grateful to the mods for cleaning up this thread.

I have started re-reading John Lukacs' Five Days in London, May 1940 which focuses on the crucial few days prior to the evacuation from Dunkirk. Dirung those five days the War Cabinet secretly debated the future conduct of the war, and in particular whether or not to extend feelers to the German government concerning what terms might be available with respect to an armistice.

Lukacs describes the power politics at play within the five-man War Cabinet, with the other Conservative members (Halifax and Chamberlain) being inclined towards discussions while the two Labour members (Attlee and Greenwood) being adamantly against. Ironically, Churchill thus came to depend upon the support of his political opponents.

Eventually after days of struggle Churchill prevailed and no overtures were made to Hitler, either directly or via Halifax's preferred intermediary Benito Mussolini. That five day period was probably the best and last time that Hitler would have to broker a peace with Britain, if only he had been aware of that. As it happened, the decision not to capture the BEF at Dunkirk, was the seminal event that ensured that Churchill would maintain control. Paradoxically, following the 'miracle' of Dunkirk, the fall of France two weeks later only served to strengthen national resolve and therefore Churchill's hand.

Churchill's masterstroke was the destruction of the French fleet in early July, which not only served to further solidify public and parliamentary support, but also caught the attention of Roosevelt, demonstrating to the Americans and the rest of the world that the lion still had teeth. Hitler's 'peace proposal' in his Reichstag speech of July 19th accordingly fell on deaf ears; there was at that point no prospect whatsoever of the British capitulating. If he had made the same effort two months earlier, especially with the BEF bottled up and laid hostage in northern France, there is a better than even chance that Churchill would have been ousted and the British would have sued for peace terms.

He did ban vivisection on animals.

But he blotted that particular copybook somewhat by allowing it on humans.

The play may have different actors and actors different names,the script overtly different but subtly similar.

1933 or 2023 some would fit in comfortably either way.

Yeah, the guy was an absolute bastard.