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Post by dappy on Jan 31, 2024 11:42:02 GMT
While I am a little too young to be affected, there is indeed a lingering general unease of Germany flowing from genuine hatred at the time of the war amongst many of those alive in the 1940s or shortly after. I think there is no doubt that those feelings contributed to the , in my view, massive shooting of ourselves in the foot that was Brexit. History does still have relevance today.
Was Dresden justified as a war aim - probably not from what I have read since this thread was launched. It feels like it was primarily an act of revenge and power which resulted in many needless deaths of innocent people - many of whom had already fled their homes in Eastern Germany (the area that is now Poland). With hindsight probably not justifiable - I understand even Churchill felt we had gone too far - but at the time and given what British people, including those decision makers, had gone through, perhaps an understandable aberration. Strange to think that if the teenager that became my mother in law had stopped in Dresden rather than pushing further west when fleeing from the Russian advance in East Prussia, my life could be very different and my kids not exist. Yet another Sliding Doors moment.
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Post by Pacifico on Jan 31, 2024 11:44:35 GMT
Effectiveness? The idea was to kill their workers and shut down their factories. It certainly had a big impact, once accuracy had improved. Well yes and no.
Accuracy did not really improve until late 1944 and even then the Germans were coming out of their shelters and dragging their machinery out of the ruined factories and starting again.
Most bombing offensives are because someone has a bomber fleet and wants to use it. Curtis Le May was in charge of the US air force during the Vietnam War and promised to bomb North Vietnam into the Stone Age. Le May was a highly intelligent man and probably knew that technologically, North Vietnam was already in the Stone Age. But he was an airman and he had the aircraft so there you go.
Well Linebacker 2 worked in that it forced the North back to the negotiating table and ended the war.
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Post by Dan Dare on Jan 31, 2024 12:12:37 GMT
The effectiveness of the strategic bombing offensive, as opposed to its morality or otherwise, is a separate discussion which I feel that deserves its own thread since there is much evidence one way or another that needs to be considered. Conflating efficacy and morality simply results in crossed signals and misunderstandings.
I will kick it off.
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Post by dappy on Jan 31, 2024 12:36:14 GMT
Out of interest, Dan, is there a wider purpose to these threads and how they relate to the current day or is WW2 history simply of interest to you (and absolutely a perfectly valid topic of conversation in itself)
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Post by Dan Dare on Jan 31, 2024 12:43:39 GMT
Yes and yes.
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Post by dappy on Jan 31, 2024 12:47:31 GMT
And the first yes is.....?
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Post by borchester on Jan 31, 2024 13:25:53 GMT
Well yes and no.
Accuracy did not really improve until late 1944 and even then the Germans were coming out of their shelters and dragging their machinery out of the ruined factories and starting again.
Most bombing offensives are because someone has a bomber fleet and wants to use it. Curtis Le May was in charge of the US air force during the Vietnam War and promised to bomb North Vietnam into the Stone Age. Le May was a highly intelligent man and probably knew that technologically, North Vietnam was already in the Stone Age. But he was an airman and he had the aircraft so there you go.
Well Linebacker 2 worked in that it forced the North back to the negotiating table and ended the war. Well yes, but Le May's idea was that North Vietnam would surrender and make him king, so maybe the bombing initiative was subject to improvement.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 31, 2024 17:01:20 GMT
The effectiveness of Allied bombing of Germany is dubious. Certainly, British night raid area bombing designed primarily to damage German civilian morale, was ineffective. And the British themselves should have known this from their own experience. After all, when the Germans bombed the hell out of British civilian areas, rather than causing a collapse of morale it tended to harden civilian determination to resist, as well as fuelling a desire to give the same back. This latter made the bomber chiefs, particularly Arthur Harris in charge of Bomber Command from early 1942, highly popular figures for giving the Germans a taste of their own medicine. But there was a general conceit in the higher echelons that German morale would crack when British morale hadnt under similar attacks. In fact it was even less likely in Germany since it's government was a dictatorial one less vulnerable to public opinion. The Americans of course joined the strategic bombing campaign in 1942 but at first their raids were fairly small scale and not until the latter half of 1943 were they starting to approach British levels in bombing intensity. The Americans believed in precision attacks in daylight and that their bombers were so heavily armed that they could effectively defend themselves against fighters. Initially until their crews gained experience they attacked easier coastal targets mostly in France. But once they began to undertake daylight raids deep into Germany they experienced devastating and insupportable losses. So their own bombing efforts were for these reasons little more effective than Britain's. But things changed drastically in the Allies favour in 1944. The first class American fighter, the mustang, began to be equipped with extra fuel drop tanks, enabling them to escort bombers right into the heart of Germany. American raids continued to suffer heavily for a time, but at the cost of the Luftwaffe being shot out of the skies over Germany itself. This also resulted in the withdrawal of German fighters from the fighting fronts to be gradually destroyed in the skies over Germany, which gifted the allies total air superiority over the fighting fronts, greatly hindering German supplies and movement in daylight. The long range mustang also allowed for precision attacks deep in the heart of Germany and the key thing was the Americans singling out of transportation and oil production targets. The latter in particular resulted in the near collapse of the supply of fuel to mechanised German forces which proved disastrous for German mobility. From the summer of 1944 onwards, there were increasing instances of German tanks and other vehicles which were in perfectly good order having to be destroyed because they lacked the fuel to move them back away from advancing enemy forces. However, it remains the case that until the advent of the long range mustang and the precision attacks on oil targets this allowed, the Allied bomber offensive was ineffective and costly to the attackers, and motivated primarily in Britain itself by a desire to inflict payback for the blitz. Effectiveness? The idea was to kill their workers and shut down their factories. It certainly had a big impact, once accuracy had improved. Killing civilians just strengthens morale as it did with us. Why should we have expected Germans to be any different? As for accuracy, the killing of civilians was resorted to because we lacked the accuracy to hit military targets that would have done much more damage to Germany. Such accuracy came with the advent of long range mustangs allowing for effective bombing in daylight, and the consequent ability to hit military targets with better precision. Certainly the emphasis on cutting German fuel production crippled German mobility from mid 1944 onwards. In this sense, bombing certainly did become more effective in the final year of the war when precision attacks in daylight without crippling bomber losses became possible.
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Post by Vinny on Jan 31, 2024 17:33:06 GMT
It wasn't a case of morale, but of mass slaughter. If you kill all the people who are involved in the production of tanks, planes, artillery etc, then it's hard to replace skilled labourers. The Nazis themselves estimated that a few more flattened cities and they were out of the war.
The Germans responded by trying to disperse production. The V2 rockets were built in underground factories.
It was brutal.
But, it was war.
We didn't have precision weapons in that era. If you hit everything and everyone, odds are your target is in there somewhere.
Without help from the Americans, Hitler would have lost anyway, only the death toll would have been a lot higher.
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Post by Equivocal on Jan 31, 2024 17:51:17 GMT
The effectiveness of the strategic bombing offensive, as opposed to its morality or otherwise, is a separate discussion which I feel that deserves its own thread since there is much evidence one way or another that needs to be considered. Conflating efficacy and morality simply results in crossed signals and misunderstandings. I will kick it off. I don't think you can separate efficacy - at least in terms of the motives of those who conceived the bombing raids. For example, if the intent was to shorten the war and save lives in the longer run, then there is a justification for taking some civilian lives. The strength of the justification varies, I suppose, on the measure of morality; deontological through utilitarian.
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Post by Dan Dare on Jan 31, 2024 18:16:06 GMT
I suspect that British war-planners were guided by von Clausewitz's dictum that that, in addition to the enemy’s military force and territory, the enemy’s will to resist is also a legitimate objective: ‘the destruction of his courage rather than his men … warfare is an act of policy’.
There seems little doubt that these words, or something very similar, animated the Nazi leadership when they launched the Blitz on Britain and launched the U-Boat war intended to starve Britain into submission, just as they later provided a legitimate rationale for Bomber Command’s own area bombing strategy, employing many techniques pioneered by the Luftwaffe in 1940-41.
Or to cite Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris: “Hitler has sown the wind, now he must reap the whirlwind”.
Modern industrial warfare means that civilians are also on the frontline, and that conventional notions of morality no longer apply. Morality is a very fungible concept anyway, it varies in time and space - there is no 'Golden Rule' handed down from on high.
Efficacy will always trump morality anyway, at least it should do if you want to win.
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Post by Equivocal on Jan 31, 2024 18:34:15 GMT
That takes you through to just war theory and its accompanying moral dilemmas.
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Post by wapentake on Jan 31, 2024 18:35:18 GMT
For most of my early life I never questioned the bombing of Dresden, in my later days I became more aware of the horror of that bombing, yet such was the threat I'd felt from the Germans, I was in Liverpool during the may blitz, I can't condemn anyone for the bombing of Dresden, It was war, and war is very nasty. If the Germans could have taken control of the UK they would have, and that could well have changed the outcome of the war. I was six years old in 1945, I remember feeling the fear of the Germans, and feeling that they were just monsters. Strangely enough I remember how my feelings about the Germans changed so dramatically after the war. The feeling gave me a deep seated pro-Europe feeling that I still have to this day. Blimey didn't realise you are more decrepit than me anyway having worked in Deutschland yeah the younger Germans were ok,the older ones a different matter.
We don't need to be in the eu to be part of europe and its security
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Post by sheepy on Jan 31, 2024 18:48:29 GMT
I am thinking something that was over the best part of 80 years ago, is hardly going to make any difference now.
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Post by Dan Dare on Jan 31, 2024 18:53:18 GMT
They'll be forming a thousands-strong human chain in Dresden on the 13th as they do every year now to keep the eebil Nahtzees at bay.
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