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Post by dappy on Jan 29, 2024 23:09:29 GMT
What's wrong with this one?
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Post by wapentake on Jan 29, 2024 23:12:44 GMT
What's wrong with this one? Well he did the OP which wasn’t specifically around Dresden.
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Post by dappy on Jan 29, 2024 23:18:50 GMT
If you want a thread about the morality or otherwise of the Allied Bomber Offensive, surely it would be very odd not to include Dresden
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Post by wapentake on Jan 29, 2024 23:50:40 GMT
If you want a thread about the morality or otherwise of the Allied Bomber Offensive, surely it would be very odd not to include Dresden You said this Seems you know more than you say
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Post by johnofgwent on Jan 30, 2024 0:04:07 GMT
This was a very long time ago Dan and frankly outside my area of expertise. Presumably the answer to your question lies in the question "could the bombing at the time the decision was made have been reasonably expected to result in the war being won when otherwise it wouldn't OR in fewer overall deaths as a result of the war being shortened as a result of the bombing." I don't know the answers to those questions. Well … As my father said in his account of living in North East London near Hainault Aerodrome during the early years … Ten minutes after Chamberlain sat down having said he had received no such undertaking, a fully functional radar system detected a problem that set off london’s air raid warning system. A Hurricane on patrol has, dad wrote, forgotten to identify itself by turning on some electronics his father was working on as it crossed the coast. It was identified as hostile and was bloody lucky not to get shot down. Over the following months of the blitz Hitler sent Dornier after Dornier to bomb the crap out of the whole area and followed that by buzz bombs AND a couple of V2’s You’ll forgive me for taking this personally. He fucking started it. He just reaped the whirlwind of what he sent our way. And the yanks only invented that nuremberg bollocks to try and stop people doing to them what they did to the japanese. There’s no such thing as a war crime until you lose …. Ask Biden about Gaza …..
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Post by dappy on Jan 30, 2024 10:23:14 GMT
If you want a thread about the morality or otherwise of the Allied Bomber Offensive, surely it would be very odd not to include Dresden You said this Seems you know more than you say I think most people are at least vaguely aware of the Dresden bombings if not the detail.
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Post by Dan Dare on Jan 30, 2024 14:14:46 GMT
What's wrong with this one? The Dresden raids are uniquely contentious and controversial in a way that even more destructive attacks such as those on Hamburg and Tokyo are not. It's a function of the widespread perception that Dresden was not a legitimate military target and had a unique and priceless cultural heritage, plus the fact that the raids happened quite late in the war when it was obvious Germany was close to defeat.
Added spice is added by the still-current notion that the Dresden attacks happened because the Russians requested them.
All this and more make Dresden a case worthy of special attention.
But don't worry, there's a thread in preparation which will appear soon enough.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Jan 30, 2024 20:41:35 GMT
The effectiveness of Allied bombing of Germany is dubious. Certainly, British night raid area bombing designed primarily to damage German civilian morale, was ineffective. And the British themselves should have known this from their own experience. After all, when the Germans bombed the hell out of British civilian areas, rather than causing a collapse of morale it tended to harden civilian determination to resist, as well as fuelling a desire to give the same back. This latter made the bomber chiefs, particularly Arthur Harris in charge of Bomber Command from early 1942, highly popular figures for giving the Germans a taste of their own medicine. But there was a general conceit in the higher echelons that German morale would crack when British morale hadnt under similar attacks. In fact it was even less likely in Germany since it's government was a dictatorial one less vulnerable to public opinion.
The Americans of course joined the strategic bombing campaign in 1942 but at first their raids were fairly small scale and not until the latter half of 1943 were they starting to approach British levels in bombing intensity. The Americans believed in precision attacks in daylight and that their bombers were so heavily armed that they could effectively defend themselves against fighters. Initially until their crews gained experience they attacked easier coastal targets mostly in France. But once they began to undertake daylight raids deep into Germany they experienced devastating and insupportable losses. So their own bombing efforts were for these reasons little more effective than Britain's.
But things changed drastically in the Allies favour in 1944. The first class American fighter, the mustang, began to be equipped with extra fuel drop tanks, enabling them to escort bombers right into the heart of Germany. American raids continued to suffer heavily for a time, but at the cost of the Luftwaffe being shot out of the skies over Germany itself. This also resulted in the withdrawal of German fighters from the fighting fronts to be gradually destroyed in the skies over Germany, which gifted the allies total air superiority over the fighting fronts, greatly hindering German supplies and movement in daylight.
The long range mustang also allowed for precision attacks deep in the heart of Germany and the key thing was the Americans singling out of transportation and oil production targets. The latter in particular resulted in the near collapse of the supply of fuel to mechanised German forces which proved disastrous for German mobility. From the summer of 1944 onwards, there were increasing instances of German tanks and other vehicles which were in perfectly good order having to be destroyed because they lacked the fuel to move them back away from advancing enemy forces.
However, it remains the case that until the advent of the long range mustang and the precision attacks on oil targets this allowed, the Allied bomber offensive was ineffective and costly to the attackers, and motivated primarily in Britain itself by a desire to inflict payback for the blitz.
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Post by Pacifico on Jan 30, 2024 22:17:23 GMT
The bombing campaign was the only way to take the war to Germany prior to the landings in Normandy and the charge through France. Yes they might not have had much impact from a purely target destruction perspective but it had the effect of tying up vast amounts of men and material in defence of the Reich that otherwise would have been used on the Eastern Front.
So worth doing simply to support the Soviet advance if for no other reason.
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Post by seniorcitizen007 on Jan 30, 2024 23:13:45 GMT
The alternative plan to avoid mass casualties from a conventional invasion of Japan if the A Bombs weren't available was to use poison gas ... with a projected death toll from the initial attack on Southern Japan of 6 million. There were stockpiles of the gas set up ready to be used. I sometimes wonder what would have happened if a weapon had been developed capable of obliterating the whole of Japan in one strike?
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Post by borchester on Jan 31, 2024 10:50:44 GMT
J K Galbraith, in his book, A Life in our Times, wrote that a strategic objective objective was anywhere within range of an allied bomber. He also noted that the bombing campaign was was remarkably inefficient and probably aided rather than hindered the Axis war effort.
Galbraith was an amused Liberal (at least in American terms), so his opinions should be viewed in that light, but his book is well worth reading. He might not be right, but he is fun.
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Post by borchester on Jan 31, 2024 10:55:59 GMT
I know little of WW2 history. I believe the bombing of Dresden resulted in many thousands of civilian deaths. At the time what was that bombing supposed to achieve?Disruption of troop movements and causing confusion,who declared total war? Bomber Harris believed that it would break the Germans will to resist. Since Hitler did not give a toss what the German people thought, some flaws can be seen in our Arthur's way of thinking, but that is show business
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Post by Vinny on Jan 31, 2024 11:20:07 GMT
The effectiveness of Allied bombing of Germany is dubious. Certainly, British night raid area bombing designed primarily to damage German civilian morale, was ineffective. And the British themselves should have known this from their own experience. After all, when the Germans bombed the hell out of British civilian areas, rather than causing a collapse of morale it tended to harden civilian determination to resist, as well as fuelling a desire to give the same back. This latter made the bomber chiefs, particularly Arthur Harris in charge of Bomber Command from early 1942, highly popular figures for giving the Germans a taste of their own medicine. But there was a general conceit in the higher echelons that German morale would crack when British morale hadnt under similar attacks. In fact it was even less likely in Germany since it's government was a dictatorial one less vulnerable to public opinion. The Americans of course joined the strategic bombing campaign in 1942 but at first their raids were fairly small scale and not until the latter half of 1943 were they starting to approach British levels in bombing intensity. The Americans believed in precision attacks in daylight and that their bombers were so heavily armed that they could effectively defend themselves against fighters. Initially until their crews gained experience they attacked easier coastal targets mostly in France. But once they began to undertake daylight raids deep into Germany they experienced devastating and insupportable losses. So their own bombing efforts were for these reasons little more effective than Britain's. But things changed drastically in the Allies favour in 1944. The first class American fighter, the mustang, began to be equipped with extra fuel drop tanks, enabling them to escort bombers right into the heart of Germany. American raids continued to suffer heavily for a time, but at the cost of the Luftwaffe being shot out of the skies over Germany itself. This also resulted in the withdrawal of German fighters from the fighting fronts to be gradually destroyed in the skies over Germany, which gifted the allies total air superiority over the fighting fronts, greatly hindering German supplies and movement in daylight. The long range mustang also allowed for precision attacks deep in the heart of Germany and the key thing was the Americans singling out of transportation and oil production targets. The latter in particular resulted in the near collapse of the supply of fuel to mechanised German forces which proved disastrous for German mobility. From the summer of 1944 onwards, there were increasing instances of German tanks and other vehicles which were in perfectly good order having to be destroyed because they lacked the fuel to move them back away from advancing enemy forces. However, it remains the case that until the advent of the long range mustang and the precision attacks on oil targets this allowed, the Allied bomber offensive was ineffective and costly to the attackers, and motivated primarily in Britain itself by a desire to inflict payback for the blitz. Effectiveness? The idea was to kill their workers and shut down their factories. It certainly had a big impact, once accuracy had improved.
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Post by see2 on Jan 31, 2024 11:28:06 GMT
For most of my early life I never questioned the bombing of Dresden, in my later days I became more aware of the horror of that bombing, yet such was the threat I'd felt from the Germans, I was in Liverpool during the may blitz, I can't condemn anyone for the bombing of Dresden, It was war, and war is very nasty. If the Germans could have taken control of the UK they would have, and that could well have changed the outcome of the war.
I was six years old in 1945, I remember feeling the fear of the Germans, and feeling that they were just monsters. Strangely enough I remember how my feelings about the Germans changed so dramatically after the war. The feeling gave me a deep seated pro-Europe feeling that I still have to this day.
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Post by borchester on Jan 31, 2024 11:34:56 GMT
The effectiveness of Allied bombing of Germany is dubious. Certainly, British night raid area bombing designed primarily to damage German civilian morale, was ineffective. And the British themselves should have known this from their own experience. After all, when the Germans bombed the hell out of British civilian areas, rather than causing a collapse of morale it tended to harden civilian determination to resist, as well as fuelling a desire to give the same back. This latter made the bomber chiefs, particularly Arthur Harris in charge of Bomber Command from early 1942, highly popular figures for giving the Germans a taste of their own medicine. But there was a general conceit in the higher echelons that German morale would crack when British morale hadnt under similar attacks. In fact it was even less likely in Germany since it's government was a dictatorial one less vulnerable to public opinion. The Americans of course joined the strategic bombing campaign in 1942 but at first their raids were fairly small scale and not until the latter half of 1943 were they starting to approach British levels in bombing intensity. The Americans believed in precision attacks in daylight and that their bombers were so heavily armed that they could effectively defend themselves against fighters. Initially until their crews gained experience they attacked easier coastal targets mostly in France. But once they began to undertake daylight raids deep into Germany they experienced devastating and insupportable losses. So their own bombing efforts were for these reasons little more effective than Britain's. But things changed drastically in the Allies favour in 1944. The first class American fighter, the mustang, began to be equipped with extra fuel drop tanks, enabling them to escort bombers right into the heart of Germany. American raids continued to suffer heavily for a time, but at the cost of the Luftwaffe being shot out of the skies over Germany itself. This also resulted in the withdrawal of German fighters from the fighting fronts to be gradually destroyed in the skies over Germany, which gifted the allies total air superiority over the fighting fronts, greatly hindering German supplies and movement in daylight. The long range mustang also allowed for precision attacks deep in the heart of Germany and the key thing was the Americans singling out of transportation and oil production targets. The latter in particular resulted in the near collapse of the supply of fuel to mechanised German forces which proved disastrous for German mobility. From the summer of 1944 onwards, there were increasing instances of German tanks and other vehicles which were in perfectly good order having to be destroyed because they lacked the fuel to move them back away from advancing enemy forces. However, it remains the case that until the advent of the long range mustang and the precision attacks on oil targets this allowed, the Allied bomber offensive was ineffective and costly to the attackers, and motivated primarily in Britain itself by a desire to inflict payback for the blitz. Effectiveness? The idea was to kill their workers and shut down their factories. It certainly had a big impact, once accuracy had improved. Well yes and no.
Accuracy did not really improve until late 1944 and even then the Germans were coming out of their shelters and dragging their machinery out of the ruined factories and starting again.
Most bombing offensives are because someone has a bomber fleet and wants to use it. Curtis Le May was in charge of the US air force during the Vietnam War and promised to bomb North Vietnam into the Stone Age. Le May was a highly intelligent man and probably knew that technologically, North Vietnam was already in the Stone Age. But he was an airman and he had the aircraft so there you go.
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